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THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: AFTER THE 
FEDERAL COURTS’ ABDICATION, WILL STATE COURTS FILL IN THE 
BREACH? 
 
By Asa Markel* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Twice in the past two years the United States Supreme Court has confronted two 
issues concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations1 (“VCCR”): compliance 
of state law enforcement officials with the VCCR and the tension between state criminal 
procedural rules and the VCCR.  At least four cases heard by the Court since 1998 have 
involved alleged violations of the VCCR by state officials; two of which involved claims 
brought by foreign governments.  Additionally, all four cases of alleged violations found 
their way into three separate suits by three different foreign governments against the 
United States in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).  One of the first American 
appellate decisions on the subject expressed “disenchantment” with state officials’ 
conduct in violating the VCCR, observing that “[t]here are disturbing implications in that 
conduct for larger interests of the United States and its citizens.”2  However, the Supreme 
Court’s latest decision, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,3 does very little to counter these 
disturbing implications. 
In light of the Court’s most recent decision on the subject, this article seeks to 
summarize the current domestic legal status and availability of the right of a foreign 
national under international law, as embodied in Article 36 of the VCCR, to be advised 
                                                 
* Attorney and solicitor with the law firm of Shorall McGoldrick Brinkmann (J.D., University of Arizona). 
1 Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 14 (Cmnd. 5219), J.O. Apr. 18, 
1971, 1971 Recueil des traités, No. 34 (Fr.) [hereinafter VCCR]. 
2 Rep. of Para. v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 1998). 
3 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).  
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upon arrest in the United States by local law enforcement officials of his or her right to 
have access to consular assistance and advice.  As will be seen, the problem in the United 
States appears largely confined to state law enforcement compliance with the VCCR, 
rather than compliance by federal law enforcement officials.  Thus, the wider legal and 
political issue for American jurists to consider is the effect on the federal government’s 
foreign relations due to state governments’ recurring failure to give effect to the rights 
established under the VCCR.  Moreover, the present impasse on the issue of Article 36 
compliance appears to originate from the restrictions imposed on the federal courts’ 
ability to review alleged violations by state law enforcement officials and concomitant 
defects in state criminal proceedings.  However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Sanchez-Llamas appears to read the VCCR to exonerate such a state of affairs.  
Nevertheless, there is reason to be concerned that these domestic legal developments (or 
lack thereof) will have more far-reaching effects for Americans living and working 
abroad, as well as foreigners arrested by state law enforcement officials in this country. 
 
II. THE CONSULAR NOTIFICATION RIGHT AND STATE COMPLIANCE 
 The VCCR, along with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations7 and the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
                                                 
7 Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 1965 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 19 (Cmnd. 2565), J.O. Apr. 17, 
1971, 1971 Recueil des traités, No. 32 (Fr.) [hereinafter  VCDR].   
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Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (“CPPC”),8 forms the core of 
international law concerning diplomatic and consular rights and obligations between 
nation states.9  The United States and 169 other nations have signed and ratified the 
VCCR.10  Article 36 of the VCCR provides three essential rights with respect to consular 
access: the right of consular officials to have “access to” and “to communicate” with their 
nationals within the host state;11 the right of consular officials to have access to their 
nationals in “prison, custody, or detention” in the host state;12 and the right of foreign 
nationals who have been arrested in the host state to be informed of their rights to 
consular access “without delay.”13  Indeed, some bilateral consular treaties require the 
host state to inform the foreign state’s consular officials of the arrest of one of its 
nationals.14  The importance of this right of consular notification to national governments 
is emphasized by its acknowledgment not only in the VCCR15 and the mandatory 
notification provisions of bilateral consular treaties, but also in the CPPC.16
                                                 
8 Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 3 (Cmnd. 7765), J.O., Oct. 16, 
2003, p. 17597 (Fr.) [hereinafter CPPC].  The federal government has specifically codified offenses against 
foreign officials and other internationally protected persons under domestic criminal law.  See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. §§ 112, 1116 (2006).  
9 This presumption is evident from the United States Code, where no specific enabling provision 
domesticates the VCCR. However, Congress has determined to allow foreign missions within the United 
States to enjoy the privileges and immunities of the VCDR even if they are not parties to that treaty, 
evidencing that treaty’s status as the yardstick for diplomatic law.  See 22 U.S.C. § 254b (2006). 
10 Sanchez-Llama v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2674 (2006). 
11 VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(a). 
12 VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(c). 
13 VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b). 
14 See, e.g., Consular Convention, U.S.-U.K., art.16, June 6, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3426, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 
37 (Cmnd. 524); Consular Convention, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. 12, June 1, 1964, 19 U.S.T. 5018. 
15 Consular representation is of such importance that the Member States of the European Union and 
Commonwealth of Nations have specifically undertaken to provide reciprocal consular representation for 
nationals of other member states wherever a European or Commonwealth citizen’s own government does 
not have adequate consular facilities.  See Council Decision 95/553, 1995 O.J. (L 314) 73 (EC); 
MARGARET P. DOXEY, THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT AND THE CONTEMPORARY COMMONWEALTH 
104 (St. Martins Press 1989) (discussing Ottawa Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) of 1973).  Countries within the Commonwealth have also agreed that where a Commonwealth 
citizen’s government has no adequate consular representation, the host government will provide consular 
services.  Id.  Indeed, the United States has expressed a clear interest in the rights of its citizens imprisoned 
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 The importance of consular access for American citizens traveling abroad has 
been acknowledged again and again by both judicial and political commentators.  In his 
dissenting opinion in Sanchez-Llamas Justice Breyer noted that the object of the Article 
36 “is to assure consular communication and assistance to such nationals, who may not 
fully understand the host country’s legal regime or even speak its language.”17  Justice 
Breyer then, quoting from State Department materials,  stated, “one of the basic functions 
of a consular office has been to provide a ‘cultural bridge’ between the host community 
and the [U.S. national].  No one needs that cultural bridge more than the individual U.S. 
citizen who has been arrested in a foreign country or imprisoned in a foreign jail.”18  The 
State Department has specifically stated: 
The right of governments, through their consular officials, to be informed 
promptly of the detention of their nationals in foreign states, and to be 
allowed prompt access to those nationals, is well established in the 
practice of civilized nations . . . . Detained foreign nationals are inevitably 
distressed by the prospect of securing and preserving their rights in a legal 
system with whose institutions and rules they are not familiar . . . The 
consul, while fully complying with the law of the detaining state, is able to 
assist these nationals in securing and preserving their rights, often by 
helping them to obtain local counsel.  The consul’s presence may also help 
assuage the distress of detained nationals.19
 
Among the services U.S. consuls provide that relate directly to legal proceedings are:  
(1) providing a list of attorneys who are familiar with the kinds of law 
relevant to the detainee’s case; (2) removing names of “dishonest, 
incompetent, or inattentive” attorneys from the list; (3) monitoring the 
well-being of the detainee; (4) protesting discrimination against the 
                                                                                                                                                 
abroad.  See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2006) (President has duty to demand and effectuate release of 
Americans wrongfully imprisoned abroad). 
16 CPPC, supra note 8, art. 6(2) (foreign national arrested for crime against internationally protected person 
specifically accorded right to consular notification).  
17 Sanchez-Llama v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2691 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
18 Id. at 2692 (quoting 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 401 (1984)). 
19 Telegram 40298 from U.S. Dept. of State to Embassy in Damascus (Feb. 21, 1975) in Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, Memorandum of Nov. 29, 2001 re: Consular Notification & Access, 2-3, 
available at http://www.cdt.org/security/011129Ichr.pdf [hereinafter “LCHR”]. 
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detainee; and (5) attending the trial, even in the absence of 
discrimination.20   
 
Along the same lines, denying a foreign national detained in this country the “cultural 
bridge” provided by his or her consulate, “deprives the foreign national of equality of 
legal process and the ability to mount a proper defense.”21  From a domestic view, the 
problem has largely been seen as one of ineffective assistance of counsel.22  Yet, the right 
to consular access implicates additional dimensions in the realm of criminal defense.  In 
at least one Texas criminal case, the U.S. Supreme Court’s remand of the case for 
reconsideration of the sentence cast light on the importance and effectiveness of consular 
assistance to the defendant.23  In that case, the Argentine Consul General specifically 
worked toward the eventual replacement of the lead defense counsel.24
These concerns are pertinent not only to American tourists, but also: 
United States citizens are scattered around the world as missionaries, 
Peace Corps volunteers, doctors, teachers and students, as travelers for 
business and for pleasure.  Their freedom and safety are seriously 
endangered if state officials fail to honor the Vienna Convention and other 
nations follow their example.25
 
 Presently, concerns about compliance with the VCCR in the United States arise 
almost entirely from the actions of state officials.  The federal government has enacted 
regulations specifically requiring that notification of consular rights be given to foreign 
                                                 
20  Id. at 3. 
21 M. Todd Parker, “Review and Reconsideration:” In Search of a Just Standard of Review for Violations 
of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 225, 244 
(2006) (quoting Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search for 
the Right to Consul, 18 Mich. J. Int'l L. 565, 601 (1997)).  Consular access would allow the defendant, 
whose family resides in another country, the ability to communicate with his family, to obtain mitigating 
evidence for the penalty phase of trial, and obtain medical history if applicable.  Id. 
22 See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2686 n.6; id. at 2690 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
23 Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000). 
24 Margaret Mendenhall, Note & Comment, 8 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 335, 350 (2001-2002). 
25 Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring) (quoted in LCHR, supra 
note 19, at 3).  
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nationals who are arrested, whether by law enforcement or immigration officials.26  The 
State Department has also published specific instructions on the notification of consular 
rights for federal, state, and local law enforcement use.27  However, only California 
appears to have given any serious thought to the issue of compliance by law enforcement 
officials with the VCCR.28  In the meantime, judicial commentators have voiced alarm at 
the number of consular rights violations often admitted by state officials.29
 The problem of state compliance with federal treaties is not a new one.  The 
United States Constitution itself was born out of an era in which the federal government 
was unable to effectively enter into treaties because of the various state governments’ 
non-compliance with existing treaty obligations.30  The most prominent cases during that 
era involved state legislatures’ unwillingness to abide by the terms of the Treaty of Peace 
of 1783 between the United States and Great Britain, wherein British creditors’ rights 
against American debtors were to be safeguarded.31  With the national government 
unable to operate on the international level, the framers of the Constitution fashioned the 
treaty power so that treaties entered into by the United States would be the “supreme law 
of the land,” and thus binding the states.32  From the earliest days of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has upheld the supremacy of federal treaties over conflicting state 
                                                 
26 E.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2006) (DOJ law enforcement personnel required to give notice of consular rights 
to arrested alien); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2006) (DHS officials required to give notice of consular rights to 
detained alien); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(e) (2006) (consular rights notification required in proceedings before 
Executive Office of Immigration Review). 
27 See, e.g., Dept. of State Publication: Consular Notification & Access: Instructions for Federal, State, and 
Local Law Enforcement & Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the Rights 
of Consular Officials to Assist Them (1998), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/CNA_book.pdf; LCHR, 
supra note 19, at 5. 
28 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c (2006) (requiring notification to alien arrestee of VCCR access rights). 
29 See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 673 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); U.S. v. Emuegbunam, 268 
F.3d 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing cases involving state violations of the VCCR). 
30 See Brief of Former United States Diplomats as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21-29, Medellin v. 
Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928),  for an excellent discussion of this issue. 
31 See id. 
32 See id.; U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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statutes.33  Accordingly, there should be no question that the VCCR is binding upon state 
officials.34
 
III. FEDERAL COURT REVIEW OF STATE VCCR VIOLATIONS 
A. Overview 
 As a matter of constitutional law, the federal courts are well positioned to correct 
treaty violations that have not been adequately addressed by the state courts.  For 
example, the Supreme Court has the authority to directly review the decisions of state 
supreme courts on issues of federal law by way of the writ of certiorari.35  However, 
where state officials have not notified an alien criminal defendant of his or her rights 
under the VCCR, the factual basis of a VCCR violation claim will likely not have been 
developed in state court.   
Federal habeas corpus review of state officials’ violations of the VCCR has been 
the central forum for American jurisprudence on the rights of alien defendants under the 
VCCR.  Accordingly, this article will focus on constraints placed on the federal habeas 
review of state court criminal convictions.  Currently, federal habeas review appears to be 
hampered by two domestic procedural constraints: procedural default rules and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).37  Both constraints 
have featured prominently in the Court’s VCCR jurisprudence. 
                                                 
33 See id. (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 235, 236-37 (1796)). 
34 The parties in Sanchez-Llamas conceded that the VCCR was “self-executing” so that no act of Congress 
was necessary for it to have domestic effect and be enforceable in American courts.  126 S. Ct. 2669, 2694 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  However, the self-executing nature of a treaty does not solve the problem 
of whether a criminal defendant has standing to complain of a VCCR violation. 
35 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). 
37 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).  
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Under the AEDPA, federal habeas review is no longer permitted unless the 
petitioner can demonstrate that the state court proceedings resulted in a decision contrary 
to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”38  Where the federal district court denies the habeas petition, federal appellate 
courts do not have jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the petition until the issuance of 
a certificate of appealability (“COA”),39 which it may not issue unless the petitioner 
demonstrates a violation of a constitutional right.40
 The problem for alien criminal defendants, who have not been informed of their 
rights under the VCCR, is that normally neither they, nor their attorneys, are aware that 
such a violation has occurred.41  As a result, the defendant will not have raised the VCCR 
violation during state trial or appellate proceedings.42  So, direct review of a state 
supreme court’s decision by the Supreme Court of any VCCR claim would be futile, 
because such a claim will not appear in the reviewable appellate record.  Often, the 
defendant invokes the VCCR only as part of the habeas proceedings in federal court, at 
which time the procedural default rule applies to bar argument on the issue.43  The 
procedural default rule bars federal habeas review of issues that were not raised in state 
courts.44  One of the major questions in cases of VCCR violations is whether the United 
                                                 
38 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).  Otherwise, the petitioner faces the considerable hurdle of showing that 
state court criminal proceedings “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2006). 
39 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006).  See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1034 
(2003). 
40 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006) (COA requires “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
right”).  See e.g., Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. 
41 See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 476-77 (June 27). 
42 See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2676-77 (2006); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 625 (4th Cir. 
1998); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998). 
43 See, e.g., LaGrand, 133 F.3d at 1261. 
44 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1355 (1998) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977)). 
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States’ obligation to give “full effect” to Article 36 consular rights45 trumps the 
considerable restrictions on federal habeas review imposed by AEDPA.  Unfortunately, 
before a defendant can even address that argument, in most cases, the procedural default 
rules have already foreclosed discussion of the VCCR in federal court. 46
B. The Procedural Default Rule 
 Concerning Article 36 of the VCCR, there is potential conflict between the 
treaty’s statement that the rights contained therein “shall be exercised in conformity with 
the laws and regulations of the receiving State” and the clear condition that “said laws 
and regulations must enable full effect to be given” to rights under the VCCR.47  The 
Supreme Court first addressed this potential conflict in Breard v. Greene, where a 
Paraguayan national failed to raise VCCR violations until his federal habeas petition.48  
The Court in Breard appears to have downplayed the conditional clause and relied 
primarily upon the provision stating VCCR rights were to be exercised in conformity 
with the procedural law of the forum.  The Court found that the procedural default rule 
barred discussion of VCCR violations during federal habeas proceedings by relying upon 
its earlier jurisprudence on treaty interpretation which found that “absent a clear and 
express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the 
implementation of the treaty in that State.”49  Nevertheless, the Court conceded that “we 
should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty 
rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such,”50 and observed that 
                                                 
45 See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b)(2). 
46 See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 
47 See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(2). 
48 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998). 
49 Id. at 375. 
50 Id. 
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“[i]t is unfortunate that this matter comes before us while proceedings are pending before 
the ICJ that might have been brought to that court earlier.”51
 In the end, the ICJ did not address the international legal implications of the 
Breard case, because the United States and Paraguay settled their differences and 
stipulated to the dismissal of the ICJ proceedings.52  However, domestic courts were left 
to rely on Breard for guidance concerning VCCR violations in criminal proceedings.  
The Supreme Court itself relied on Breard in dismissing Germany’s 1999 domestic 
lawsuit against the United States and the State of Arizona.53  However, that case turned 
on a separate holding of Breard that had reiterated the sovereign immunity of the United 
States and the Eleventh Amendment bar of suits against a state in federal court.54  
Germany’s domestic lawsuit involved consular rights violations against two German 
nationals in Arizona, which the defense had not raised in state court before seeking 
federal habeas review.55  Nevertheless, Germany’s international suit against the United 
States in the ICJ resulted in a judgment that the procedural default rule violated the 
United States’ VCCR obligations, where no meaningful review was given.56  Before the 
                                                 
51 Id. at 378. 
52 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Order of 
Nov. 10).  
53 F.R.G. v. U.S., 526 U.S. 111, 112, 119 S. Ct. 1016, 1017 (1999).   
54 Id.  The Eleventh Amendment has been an impediment in several domestic VCCR enforcement actions 
by foreign states in federal courts.  See, e.g., Rep. of Para. v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 1998); 
Mex. v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997).  There do not appear to be any similar suits by foreign 
governments in state courts. However, the prospect remains open provided that the hurdle of a forum 
state’s sovereign immunity can be overcome.  Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1350 (district courts have original 
jurisdiction over international tort claims by aliens), and 1351 (district courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over cases where foreign consul or diplomat is defendant), with Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 24 N.E.2d 
81, 83 (N.Y. 1939) (foreign governments may request vindication of rights in state court). 
55 See LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, LaGrand v. Arizona, 526 U.S. 
1001, 119 S. Ct. 1137 (1999).  The underlying state court proceedings involved questions of purely 
domestic law.  See State v. LaGrand (Walter), 153 Ariz. 21, 734 P.2d 563 (1987); State v. LaGrand (Karl), 
152 Ariz. 483, 733 P.2d 1066 (1987), cert. denied, LaGrand v. Arizona, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S. Ct. 206 
(1987). 
56 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497-98, 515-16 (June 27). 
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Supreme Court could revisit the issue, Mexico obtained another ICJ judgment against the 
United States directing that the VCCR required review for possible prejudice, regardless 
of domestic procedural default rules.57
 The issue of VCCR violations took center stage again in the case of one of the 
Mexican nationals on whose behalf Mexico had sued the United States in the ICJ.58  In 
Medellin v. Dretke, the Fifth Circuit was confronted with a defendant whose VCCR 
violation claims had already been barred by the procedural default rule in state habeas 
proceedings, prior to the denial of his petition for federal habeas relief.59  The petitioner 
argued that since the Supreme Court’s opinion in Breard, the ICJ had not only 
determined that procedural default should not be a complete bar to post-conviction 
review of VCCR rights violations, but also had specifically held that post-conviction 
review should be considered for this particular petitioner (and others on whose behalf 
Mexico had sued).60  International law apparently moved more quickly than domestic 
jurisprudence, as prophesied in Lord Denning’s famous admonition that, in matters of 
international law, lower courts need not always wait for the higher courts to change the 
rule.61 However, the Fifth Circuit decided that the Breard opinion prevented it from 
granting the COA necessary for Medellin’s federal habeas petition to go forward.62
                                                 
57 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 65, ¶ 138 (Mar. 
31).  
58 Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2004). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529, 554 (Eng. C.A.).  In Lord 
Denning’s famous words: “International law knows no rule of stare decisis.  If this court today is satisfied 
that the rule of international law on a subject has changed from what it was 50 or 60 years ago, it can give 
effect to that change-and apply the change in our English law-without waiting for the House of Lords to do 
it.”  Id.  One of his colleagues on the English Court of Appeal came to Lord Denning’s aid, observing that 
for international commercial actors who rely on predictable judicial outcomes: “Lastly, there must be a 
greater risk of confusion if precepts discarded outside England by a majority (or perhaps all) of civilized 
states are preserved as effective in English courts in a sort of judicial aspic.”  Id. at 579 (per Shaw, L.J.).  
Those familiar with Lord Denning’s distinguished career may also recall his “one-man crusade” to alter the 
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 The Supreme Court accepted review of Medellin’s case, where the issues to be 
decided revolved around the domestic effect of the ICJ’s interpretations of the VCCR as a 
matter of comity, stare decisis, and res judicata.63  In the end, the Supreme Court 
managed to avoid these politically sensitive questions when President George W. Bush 
issued a memorandum directing state courts to give effect to the ICJ’s judgment in favor 
of Mexico.64  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals followed the presidential directive 
and granted a last minute habeas review. The Supreme Court deferred to this decision, 
finding that “state proceeding may provide Medellin with the review and reconsideration 
of his Vienna Convention claim that the ICJ required, and that Medellin now seeks in this 
proceeding.”65  With the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the writ of certiorari in his case, 
the state court will decide Medellin’s Vienna Convention claims.66
 Finally, in Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court took the VCCR head on.  The 
Court rejected the ICJ’s requirement to disregard procedural default rules where 
necessary, and instead based its decision upon the text of the treaty itself and the 
supposed intentions of the treaty parties.  The Court held fast to its earlier opinion in 
Breard and came to the conclusion that (1) it was not bound by the decisions of the ICJ,67 
                                                                                                                                                 
doctrine of stare decisis in domestic jurisprudence as well.  See Davis v. Johnson, [1979] A.C. 264, 325 
(U.K.H.L.) (per Lord Diplock). 
62 Medellin, 371 F.3d at 274.  The panel also determined that it was bound by an earlier en banc opinion by 
the same circuit in the case of U.S. v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2004), finding that the 
VCCR did not provide any rights to individuals in U.S. courts.  Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280. 
63 See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661-62 (2005).  
64 Id. at 663. 
65 Id. at 664.  The state court proceedings are still pending.  See Ex parte Medellin, 2005 WL 1532996 
(Tex. Crim. App. June 22, 2005). 
66 See id. at 667. 
67 The majority in Sanchez-Llamas devoted a great deal of space to justifying its refusal to apply pertinent 
ICJ precedent.  There is no question that neither the U.S. Constitution, the Statute of the I.C.J., 59 Stat. 
1062, T.S. No. 993 (1945), nor the U.N. Charter, 59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No. 933 (1945), requires U.S. courts to 
follow ICJ decisions.  See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684-85 (2006).  However, 
Sanchez-Llamas represents the first case in which the high court has declined to do so.  See id. at 2701–02 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  The opinion signals the United States’ withdrawal from the ICJ’s compulsory 
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and (2) “[t]he ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 is inconsistent with the basic framework 
of an adversary system” like that of the United States.68  The majority in Sanchez-Llamas 
determined that “[i]n our system . . . the responsibility for failing to raise an issue 
generally rests with the parties themselves,” whereas in an “inquisitorial” system, used by 
the majority of parties to the VCCR, the judge investigates the facts and law 
independently of the parties.69   
One reading of Sanchez-Llamas is that the VCCR’s provision on the exercise of 
treaty rights according to local procedural rules permits common law jurisdictions to 
ignore the ICJ’s censure of procedural default rules. The Court justifies this interpretation 
by arguing that default rules are integral to the adversarial system.70  Moreover, the 
majority in Sanchez-Llamas also noted that in inquisitorial systems “the failure to raise a 
legal error can in part be attributable to the magistrate, and thus to the state itself,” unlike 
in an adversarial system.71  The Court ultimately found that the United States is not in 
violation of the VCCR when its courts employ blanket procedural default rules, and thus 
it would no not be necessary to revisit the messy issue of trumping state and federal 
procedural default doctrines with a federal treaty. 
                                                                                                                                                 
jurisdiction for VCCR disputes.   Moreover, the majority’s argument that the United States’ withdrawal 
from the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 
U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 14 (Cmnd. 5219), somehow 
negates the effect of the ICJ’s opinions prior to the U.S. withdrawal is inconsistent with the court’s own 
wholesale adoption of precedent from appellate court decisions of the now defunct Articles of Confederacy.  
Compare Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685, with Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 85-86 (1795) 
(affirming jurisdiction of defunct U.S. Ct. App. in Cases of Capture).  Ironically, the U.S. played a key role 
in drafting the Optional Protocol and was the first country to invoke its compulsory jurisdictional clause in 
her 1979 dispute with Iran.  Camille Cancio, The United States’ International Obligations and the Impact 
on Federalism: Medellin v. Dretke and the Force of Avena in American Courts, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 1047, 
1052 (2006). 
68 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2686. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id.  However, this appears to contradict cases where the Supreme Court considered court enforcement of 
unconstitutional private covenants a  “state action.”  E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14, 68 S. Ct. 
836, 842 (1948). 
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C. Domestic Conflicts between the AEDPA and the VCCR 
 The Supreme Court ruling in Sanchez-Llamas had two other important results: the 
vindication of procedural default rules in Breard remains in place, and a criminal 
defendant must raise any VCCR claims in state court proceedings before seeking federal 
habeas review.  However, the question remains as to whether federal habeas relief can be 
extended to defendants convicted in state courts, even where the claim was properly 
developed in state court proceedings.  The Supreme Court has not specifically revisited 
the conflict between the AEDPA and the VCCR since its decision in Breard.  
Nevertheless, the Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas lends no support whatsoever to 
criminal defendants’ attempts to base federal habeas review of their state convictions on 
VCCR claims.  The majority in Sanchez-Llamas specifically observed that “[a] foreign 
national detained on suspicion of crime, like anyone else in our country, enjoys under our 
system the protections of the Due Process Clause . . . Article 36 adds little to these ‘legal 
options.’”72  Such clear judicial indifference from the nation’s highest court to the 
importance of the VCCR rights of foreign nationals will likely have a chilling effect on 
petitions for federal habeas review based on violations of VCCR rights.   
Under the AEDPA, a successful habeas petition against a state court conviction 
requires the violation of a right under federal law.  However, the Supreme Court in 
Sanchez-Llamas declined to decide whether the VCCR grants rights to individuals (as 
opposed to state parties to the treaty).73  The Court also refused to grant any appreciable 
remedy for VCCR violations.74  After Sanchez-Llamas, federal district judges cannot be 
faulted for denying habeas review of state convictions where VCCR rights violations 
                                                 
72 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2681-82. 
73 Id. at 2677-78. 
74 Id. at 2682, 2687. 
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form the basis of the defendant’s petition.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not yet 
even determined whether individuals have VCCR rights under federal law. 
Federal appellate courts, moreover, are not likely to issue many COA’s in VCCR 
violation cases.  In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court seems to have answered the 
question it posed in Medellin as to whether a person convicted in spite of a violation of 
VCCR rights could clear the considerable hurdle of demonstrating that the deprivation of 
a treaty right is legally comparable to the deprivation of a constitutional right.75  By 
deciding that a mandatory exculpatory rule in VCCR rights violation cases is not 
appropriate, the Court in Sanchez-Llamas effectively ruled out the possibility that anyone 
in such cases can show the violation of a constitutional right.76  The basis of the Court’s 
refusal to impose such a rule arose out of its conclusion that VCCR notification does not 
implicate any constitutional concerns and does little to strengthen any applicable 
constitutional safeguards.77  A COA is contingent on the deprivation of a constitutional 
right, and the Sanchez-Llamas opinion appears to be the clearest indication that the 
deprivation of the VCCR notification right does not rise to that level. 
The AEDPA also thwarts the ICJ’s interpretation of the VCCR on a more direct 
level.  The AEDPA requires that a defendant exhaust all state court remedies prior to 
seeking review in federal court.78  The AEDPA also declares that a petitioner seeking 
federal habeas review of a state conviction based on a treaty violation cannot obtain an 
evidentiary hearing where the petitioner failed to develop the factual basis of the treaty 
                                                 
75 See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005). 
76 See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682. 
77 Id. at 2681-82. 
78 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(1)(A), (b)(3) (2006). 
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violation in state court.79  This specific rule for treaty violations essentially renders the 
federal courts unable to carry out the ICJ’s rulings in La Grand and Avena.  The Court in 
Breard v. Greene accepted it as a given that the AEDPA superseded the United States’ 
obligations under the VCCR.80  In coming to this conclusion, the Court employed the lex 
posterior rule adopted in Whitney v. Robertson,81 which mechanically establishes that 
where a federal statute conflicts with a treaty, “the one last in date will control the 
other.”82  The ultimate result of the AEDPA is that state courts have been further 
insulated from federal review, even where state court criminal decisions implicate federal 
treaties. 
 
D. Alternative Interpretations of the AEDPA’s Effects on U.S. VCCR Obligations 
The Supreme Court’s mechanical use of the lex posterior rule in Breard was not 
its only option.  After all, an older rule of statutory interpretation urges courts to interpret 
statutes in line with pre-existing treaty obligations unless there is an express legislative 
declaration to the contrary.83  This “Charming Betsy doctrine” has persisted for well over 
two hundred years.84  It is a doctrine of judicial interpretation not limited to American 
                                                 
79 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (2006).  However, the terms of these statutory provisions speak in general 
terms regarding habeas proceedings and do not single out claimed treaty violations for treatment that differs 
from other federal legal claims. 
80 See 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998). 
81 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S. Ct. 456, 458 (1888).  See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 
1231 (1957). 
82 Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (quoting Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194).  The same standard is generally employed in 
international law for conflicting legal norms.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 30(3), 
May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmnd. 7964) (parties to same 
treaty will give effect to later adopted obligations).  
83 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“…an act of Congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains ….”). 
84 See Michael Franck, Note, The Future of Judicial Internationalism: Charming Betsy, Medellin v. Dretke, 
and the Consular Rights Dispute, 86 B.U. L. REV. 515, 519 (2006). 
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courts.85  The wisdom of this approach is evident when one considers that a court’s 
failure to read a new statute over a pre-existing treaty can be remedied by more specific 
domestic legislation, while the same court’s over-eagerness to read down treaty 
obligations and give preeminence to newly passed statutes would result in the nation’s 
withdrawal (intentional or not) from a treaty in spite of its earlier negotiation, adoption, 
signature, and ratification processes.  The Charming Betsy doctrine acknowledges that 
the legislature has the means to correct the courts’ decisions, while, if left to their own 
devices, the courts have the power to wreak havoc on the Executive’s ability to conduct 
foreign policy. 
While the Charming Betsy doctrine and its call for judicial restraint may seem 
sensible enough, American courts have no uniform rule of treaty interpretation with 
respect to statutory derogation of treaty obligations.  The strict lex posterior rule adopted 
in Breard for VCCR cases appears to be one of three co-existing standards for resolving 
conflicts between treaties and federal statutes.86  As stated above, the oldest standard 
originates with Charming Betsy.  After the Supreme Court announced its decision in 
Charming Betsy, lower federal courts divided along lines that one commentator has 
termed the “internationalist” and “moderate” standards under the wider doctrine.87  Under 
the “internationalist” interpretation of the doctrine, in order for a court to disregard a 
treaty obligation in favor of a federal statute, the statute must contain “the clearest of 
expressions on the part of Congress.”88  In United States v. Palestinian Liberation 
                                                 
85 E.g., Garland v. Brit. Rail Eng’g Ltd., [1983] 2 A.C. 751, 771 (U.K.H.L.) (British courts ought to 
construe later statutes in conformity with pre-existing treaties wherever possible).  Some other nations’ 
constitutions have solidified this rule of construction by specifically subordinating domestic legislation to 
treaty law.  E.g., 1958 CONST. 55 (Fr.); CONST. ARG. 75(22). 
86 See Franck, supra note 84, generally. 
87 Id. at 522, 529. 
88 Id. at 523-24 (quoting U.S. v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
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Organization,89 the district court refused to override the U.N. Headquarters Agreement90 
in favor of a statute which prohibited the establishment of a PLO office in the United 
States, “notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.”91  The district court 
essentially required the statute to explicitly state that it was superseding the Headquarters 
Agreement before it would disregard the treaty.92
However, under the “moderate” approach to the Charming Betsy doctrine, some 
courts do not require Congress to expressly name the treaty being superseded, but will 
disregard a treaty where Congress has expressed its intent to “override the protection that 
a treaty would otherwise provide.”93  Thus, the disagreement between the two 
interpretations of the Charming Betsy doctrine stems from differences on how “express” 
a congressional desire to supersede a treaty must be.94  Under the internationalist 
standard, Congress has to name the treaty to be superseded, while under the moderate 
standard, Congress need only expressly override a right or protection otherwise offered 
by a treaty.  While the moderate standard usually favors the domestic statute, the ultimate 
decision in such cases can only be made after identifying Congress’s clear intent to 
abrogate the treaty.95  In contrast, under the third model of treaty-statute conflict analysis, 
exemplified in Breard, no analysis of congressional intent is necessary, since the later 
law automatically controls.96
                                                 
89 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  
90 Pub. L. No. 80-357, 61 Stat. 3416 (1947). 
91 22 U.S.C. § 5202(3) (2006). 
92 P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. at 1471. 
93 Franck, supra note 84, at 529 (citing Havana Club Holding v. Galleon, 203 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 
2000)). 
94 See id.  
95 Id. at 531. 
96 See id. 
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In the cases of the conflict between the AEDPA and the VCCR, the only 
interpretive standard that could save the VCCR is the internationalist approach to the 
Charming Betsy doctrine.  It is clear from the AEDPA that state remedies must be 
exhausted before allowing a resort to federal habeas review, and federal courts will not 
rule on treaty rights violations during habeas proceedings without a factual record 
established in state court.  Accordingly, the VCCR’s requirement that “full effect” be 
given to the rights established under Article 36 conflicts with the prohibitions on federal 
review contained in the AEDPA.  The coexistence of the lex posterior rule announced in 
Whitney v. Robertson and the Charming Betsy doctrine in U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence represents a puzzling lacuna in the law on conflicts of federal law.  The fact 
that both standards come from the Supreme Court and neither has been overruled 
undermines the precedential effect of Breard’s view of the VCCR.  Sanchez-Llamas did 
not resolve this conflict between the Whitney and Charming Betsy standards.  
Nevertheless, under Breard, the AEDPA trumps the VCCR. 
Sanchez-Llamas avoided the issue of the conflict between AEDPA and the VCCR 
by relying on the language in Article 36(2) and on case law concerning treaty 
interpretation.  As a result, the Court determined that the rules for implementing Article 
36 rights were to be left to the domestic law of the state parties to the VCCR.  Under that 
analysis, the United States can never be in violation of the VCCR by merely employing 
neutral procedural rules.  Since the AEDPA imposes only neutral procedural rules, it does 
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not run afoul of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the VCCR or the plain text of 
Article 36(2).  However, the ICJ’s interpretation of the VCCR taking precedence over 
procedural default rules remains. If the AEDPA imposes such rules, then it represents a 
departure from the United States’ treaty obligations under the VCCR according to the 
ICJ.  Since the ICJ is perhaps the most widely respected authority on public international 
law,98 the effect of the Supreme Court’s refusal to apply ICJ precedent is significant.  In 
the meantime, the Court appears to have given its imprimatur to Congress’ grant of 
authority to the states to ignore treaty violations with impunity.  Under the AEDPA and 
Sanchez-Llamas, treaty violations in state courts, particularly of the VCCR, will probably 
not even be subject to review in federal habeas proceedings.99
IV. PRECLUSION AS REMEDY FOR TREATY VIOLATION 
The Court in Sanchez-Llamas also considered whether the remedy of mandatory 
exclusion was proper in cases where state law enforcement officials had violated the 
VCCR by failing to inform an arrested alien of his or her rights under the treaty.100  The 
                                                 
98 See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2700-01 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 103 cmt. b (1987)); See Susan W. 
Tiefenbrun, The Role of the World Court in Settling International Disputes: A Recent Assessment, 20 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1997); Edith Brown Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 134 (L. Damrosch ed. 
1987). 
99 There remains, of course, the separate route of domestic civil redress for VCCR violations, which is 
beyond the scope of this article.  Nevertheless, at least one court has specifically determined that a state 
party to the VCCR has standing in U.S. courts to sue for violations of the VCCR against its nationals.  Rep. 
of Para. v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 1998).  
However, the Eleventh Amendment remains a hurdle to such suits in federal court where the defendant 
state has not waived its immunity from suit.  Id.  Additionally, at least one federal circuit court has 
determined the alien defendant in criminal proceedings may bring a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act  
for state criminal proceedings that run afoul of the VCCR.  Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005).  
However, American legal commentators have already begun to show vehemence against such domestic 
vindication of international legal rights.  E.g., Anthony Jones, Comment, Jogi v. Voges: Has the Seventh 
Circuit Opened the Floodgates to Vienna Convention Litigation in U.S. Courts?, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 425 
(2006).  Such statements of domestic disinterest for the plight of foreigners in the American criminal justice 
system do little to solve the larger problem of safeguarding the rights of Americans abroad by domestic 
compliance with the VCCR. 
100 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2677 (2006). 
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Court determined that mandatory suppression was not necessary.101  However, the 
petitioner in Sanchez-Llamas seeking suppression had conceded to the question of 
whether mandatory exclusion was to be decided by domestic law rather than international 
law.102  The petitioner was limited to this purely domestic legal argument, since the ICJ 
had already specifically rejected the international imposition of a mandatory exclusionary 
rule.103  Unfortunately for the petitioner in Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court declined 
to fashion a remedy “for the enforcement of federal law in state-court criminal 
proceedings.”104   
The Court began its rejection of mandatory exclusion by observing that “our 
authority to create a judicial remedy applicable in state court must lie, if anywhere, in the 
treaty itself.”105  The Court determined that Article 36(2) deferred to American domestic 
law for the implementation of Article 36 rights.106  The Court also determined that 
mandatory exclusionary rules had only been developed to address Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment issues,107 whereas the right to consular notification “is at best remotely 
connected to the gathering of evidence.  Article 36 has nothing whatsoever to do with 
searches or interrogations.”108  Furthermore, while the unreliability of confessions under 
duress is a valid consideration for imposition of a mandatory exclusionary rule, “[t]he 
failure to inform a defendant of his Article 36 rights is unlikely, with any frequency, to 
                                                 
101 Id. at 2682. 
102 Id. at 2678-79. 
103 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 61 (Mar. 31). 
104 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2679. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 2680. 
107 Id. at 2680-81. 
108 Id. at 2681.  The ICJ also rejected the notion that VCCR notification must occur before any 
interrogation.  Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. at 49. 
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produce unreliable confessions.”109  Additionally, the Court deferred to the government’s 
observation that “[w]e are unaware of any country party to the [Vienna Convention] that 
provides remedies for violations of consular notification through its domestic criminal 
justice system.”110
Sanchez-Llamas, however, leaves open the question of whether state courts are 
free to adopt mandatory or discretionary exclusionary rules of their own in cases of 
VCCR notification rights violations.111  Since the Court has clearly stated that Article 36 
“adds little” to the domestic legal rights of a criminal defendant in American courts,112 it 
is unlikely that state supreme courts will jump at the chance to impose mandatory 
exclusionary rules against state law enforcement officials that violate Article 36.  
Nevertheless, there is some reason to think that a discretionary exclusionary rule for 
Article 36 violations would be appropriate in both state and federal courts.   
To begin with, the domestic courts of other common law countries reserve the 
right to exclude evidence where there has been an egregious violation of Article 36.  
Cases from Canada and Australia show that trial judges in those countries have 
considered Article 36 violations when deciding whether to exclude evidence in criminal 
                                                 
109 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2681. 
110 Id. at 2680.  Reviewing the practices of the United States’ treaty partners in their implementation of the 
same treaty is an accepted means of determining the United States’ own compliance with that treaty.  Id. at 
2689 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175-76 
(1999)).  When undertaking such comparative analyses, the court probably needs to underscore the 
reasoning for the examination of foreign sources in light of the various domestic voices raised in staunch 
opposition to any use of foreign law.  See, e.g., Const. Restoration Act, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. §§ 201, 
302 (2005) (banning the use of non-Anglo-American sources for judicial interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution and calling for the impeachment of judges who violate the ban). 
111 As to the question of review of the failure of state police to give notice to a defendant of his or her rights 
under the VCCR, this question appears to have been “collapsed” into the domestic ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  See Force of Judgments by the Int’l Court of Justice – Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, 119 HARV. L. REV. 327, 336 (2005). 
112 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682. 
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proceedings.113  Moreover, both Ireland and the United Kingdom have domestic statutory 
and regulatory frameworks that enable the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of 
the VCCR.114   
Giving trial judges the discretion to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the 
VCCR would insulate these decisions from appellate reversal, thus making the Article 36 
right to notification more real.  Yet, it would also allow American courts to deliver an 
“effective remedy” for VCCR violations, which is all that some sources interpret the 
ICJ’s decisions against the United States to require.115  So far most state courts have not 
                                                 
113 See Tan Seng Kiah v. Queen (2001) 160 F.L.R. 26 (Austl.); Regina v. Tan [2001] W.A.S.C. 275 (Austl.) 
(Sup. Ct. W. Austl.); Regina v. Partak, [2001] 160 C.C.C.3d 553, ¶ 63 (Can.); Queen v. Van Bergen, [2000] 
261 A.R. 387, 390 (Can.) (Ct. App. Alberta).  The case of Regina v. Su, [1997] 1 V.R. 1, 55 (Austl.) (Sup. 
Ct. Vic.) does not address the VCCR per se, but did consider the foreign defendant’s unfamiliarity with the 
domestic legal system in determining whether inculpatory evidence should have been excluded for 
threatening the “fairness” of the criminal proceedings.  See Brief of Crim. Justice Legal Foundation as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14-15, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566).  
Certain amici in Sanchez-Llamas also cited Regina v. Bassil and Mouffaregi (Acton Crown Ct. 1990) and 
Regina v. Van Axel and Wezer (Snaresbrook Crown Ct. 1991), handed down by the same English trial 
judge.  Id. at 18.  In these cases, the judge suppressed evidence obtained in violation of Article 36 because 
of the importance of Britain’s treaty obligations and of the right to notification itself.  See Legal Action 23 
(Dec. 1990). 
114 See Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda Síochána Stations); 
Regulations 1987, Regulation 14 (Irish police required to give advisory on VCCR); Code of Practice C, 
available at http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-and-publications/publication/operational-
policing/PACE_Chapter_C.pdf?view=Binary (July 2006 revisions per Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (U.K.); 
Reg. 7.1 requires that arrestee “must be informed as soon as practicable” of VCCR rights authorized by 
Police & Crim. Evid. Act 1984 (Code of Practice C & Code of Practice H) Order 2006, S.I. 2006/1938 
(U.K.)).  English courts are specifically empowered to take into account the fairness of allowing evidence 
that was obtained in breach of a statute or regulations when deciding whether to exclude the evidence.  
Police & Crim. Evid. Act, 1984, c. 60, § 78 (U.K.).  Even though Article 36 was not among the VCCR 
provisions stated to have the force of law within the U.K.  See Consular Relations Act, 1968, c. 18, § 1 and 
Sch. 1 (U.K.).  Nevertheless, earlier sources have claimed that British courts had the power at common law 
to suppress evidence where the manner of its procurement brought the fairness of proceedings into doubt.  
R. v. Sang, [1980] 2 A.C. 402, 435 (U.K.H.L.) (per Lord Diplock).  The new statutory power of 
suppression applies even if the illegally obtained evidence is reliable.  However, some British jurists have 
claimed a similar discretion at common law “to exclude evidence if it is necessary in order to secure a fair 
trial for the accused.”  Scott v. R., [1989] A.C. 1242, 1256 (U.K.P.C.).  The Sanchez-Llamas majority’s 
bold assertion that American courts invented the remedy of suppression and continue to be the only courts 
that dispense it is refuted by the strength and antiquity of the authorities to the contrary.  126 S. Ct. at 2706 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 262, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 
1783)). 
115 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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discussed the notion,116 preferring, like the Supreme Court, to address the issue as a 
choice between no exclusion or mandatory exclusion.117  In such cases, American courts 
should evaluate the need for suppression in terms of “prejudice” to the defendant.118  This 
would arguably be equivalent to the “fairness” inquiry conducted by trial judges in other 
common law jurisdictions.119
The majority in Sanchez-Llamas dismissed the idea of putting aside the 
procedural default rule in cases of VCCR violations, in part because it felt that doing 
away with such default rules was anathema to the adversarial common law system.  
However, common law systems rely on evidentiary suppression more than inquisitorial 
civil law systems. In an inquisitorial proceeding, the judge is able to “put aside” or 
“forget about” evidence obtained in violation of the law more readily than a jury.120  
Accordingly there is less reason to keep such evidence away from the fact-finder, because 
in inquisitorial proceedings the judge is able to weigh the importance of infractions by the 
police by imposing, for example, a more lenient sentence.121  In other words, rules of 
evidentiary suppression actually have more utility in American courts than in the courts 
of most of America’s treaty partners. 
 
V. OVERSEAS EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC VCCR JURISPRUDENCE 
                                                 
116 One exception is the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Torres v. State, where it declined to 
require an alien criminal defendant to show “consular assistance would, or could, have made a difference in 
the outcome of the criminal trial.”  120 P.3d 1184, 1186-87 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). 
117 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2706 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[t]he majority answers in absolute terms, 
stating that ‘suppression is not an appropriate remedy for a violation of the Convention’ . . . [however] 
sometimes suppression could prove the only effective remedy”); E.g., State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70, 
83, 75 P.3d 675, 688 (2003) (declining to impose mandatory suppression in case of VCCR notification 
violation). 
118 See Parker, supra note 21, at 255. 
119 See sources cited supra note 113. 
120 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.  Ct. at 2707 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
121 See id. 
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The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sanchez-Llamas is good domestic constitutional 
law.  However, the ramifications of American domestic practices overseas remains an 
open question, since the VCCR is an international treaty representing the obligations of 
the United States to other nations.  The majority in Sanchez-Llamas paid lip service to 
this fact when it concluded that “[o]ur holding in no way disparages the importance of the 
Vienna Convention.”122  Apparently, the majority felt that “[a]lthough these cases involve 
the delicate question of the application of an international treaty, the issues in many ways 
turn on established principles of domestic law.”123  Chief Justice Rehnquist perhaps did a 
better job of highlighting the “delicate” nature of the problem in U.S. v. Alvarez-
Machain, where the Court held that American courts had jurisdiction to try a Mexican 
national who had been abducted while in Mexico by federal agents and forcibly taken to 
the U.S. for trial.124  He noted that such an abduction “may be in violation of general 
international law principles” as a clear invasion of Mexico’s sovereignty.125   
The basic problem in consular rights cases is that the realms of domestic and 
international law are mutually exclusive in the American constitutional order.126  As an 
example, “[s]tatutes inconsistent with principles of customary international law may well 
lead to international law violations.  But within the domestic legal realm, that inconsistent 
statute simply modifies or supersedes customary international law to the extent of the 
inconsistency.”127  The result is that in domestic courts, “no enactment of Congress can 
                                                 
122 Id. at 2687. 
123 Id. 
124 504 U.S. 655, 669-70, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196-97 (1992). 
125 Id. at 670. 
126 See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  This is in 
contrast to those countries whose constitutions expressly subordinate domestic law to the country’s 
international legal obligations.  Id. at 939.  The D.C. Circuit also specifically concluded in that case that 
“private parties have no cause of action in this court to enforce an ICJ decision.”  Id. at 934. 
127 Id. at 938. 
7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 25 
be challenged on the ground that it violates customary international law.”128  The lex 
posterior rule places international treaties on par with international custom; for domestic 
purposes, both can be superseded by a later-enacted federal statute.  However, because 
the realms of international and domestic law are also mutually exclusive, there remains a 
distinct legal effect between the United States and its treaty partners that is separate from 
issues of domestic constitutionality. 
At this point in time, there is no certainty as to whether the rule in Sanchez-
Llamas puts the United States in breach of its obligations under the VCCR.  Considering 
such, the laws and practices of other countries are important in the interpretation of the 
VCCR.129  The VCCR itself is obviously an important treaty, as the rights of a traveler in 
a foreign country often do, and should, have a certain resonance with the American 
public.  This is evident with the general public’s understanding of the reciprocal nature of 
public international law.  For example, American newspapers responded to the ICJ 
decisions against the United States with predictions that if the United States did not honor 
its commitments under the VCCR, other countries may decide not to extend consular 
rights notification to American citizens abroad.130  Other countries do have the option of 
suspending their obligations to the United States under the VCCR, if they consider the 
                                                 
128 Id. at 939. 
129 A newly developed custom will not usually supersede a treaty obligation in the same way that a treaty 
will supersede pre-existing custom, but developments in national practices that lead to changes in 
customary law can lead to changes in the interpretation of treaty obligations.  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hung./Slovak.), 1997 I.C.J. 6, 64 (Sept. 25). 
130 See Michael Candela, Casenote, Judicial Notification: A Simple Solution to Ensure Compliance with the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 343, 370 (2006).  For example, when the 
United States began the annoying practice of photographing and fingerprinting all foreigners entering the 
country, Brazil retaliated by singling out incoming Americans for equivalent treatment.  This episode 
culminated in the arrest of an American commercial pilot who made an obscene gesture at the camera.  US 
pilot freed after paying a $12,775 fine, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 16, 2004), available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-01/16/content_299367.htm.  However, it would be 
considerably less humorous were an American tourist to disappear in police custody after being denied the 
right to access U.S. consular officials or to have them notified of the arrest. 
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U.S. to be in breach of its own obligations under that treaty.131  This doctrine of 
“retorsion,” or countermeasures, has always been available to nations where one of their 
treaty partners has refused to uphold its legal obligations.132  Presently, with two ICJ 
decisions against the United States, the prospect of being found in violation of the VCCR 
is real, even if it is slight.133  Accordingly, a great deal of attention should be paid to 
jurisprudential developments abroad.134
While Sanchez-Llamas refused to determine whether the VCCR actually vested 
rights in individuals135 (in spite of two clear ICJ holdings that Article 36 did vest 
individuals with enforceable rights),136 the lower federal courts are divided on the 
question.137  However, outside of the United States, courts are generally moving in a 
                                                 
131 JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 398-99 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., Oxford 6th ed. 1963). 
132 Sanchez-Llama v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2707 (2206) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The ICJ discussed the 
more obvious resort states have to seek monetary damages for breaches of international law.  Case 
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 59-60, ¶ 121 (Mar. 31) 
(citing Chorzow Factory Case (Pol. v. Ger.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21).  However, damages suits 
between countries have little or no impact on the average American citizen. 
133 As noted above, few countries outside of the common law world appear to address the issue of redress 
of VCCR violations.  For example, while French law gives primacy to the VCCR above domestic statutes, 
there is only one corresponding domestic regulation giving effect to VCCR rights.  FR. C. PR. PÉN. art. 
D264 (providing that foreign consular officials shall have access to their nationals imprisoned in France 
where the sending country affords similar rights to French consular officials).  However, no domestic 
regulation requires that police specifically advise an alien arrestee of his or her rights under the VCCR.  
E.g., FR. C. PR. PÉN. art. R53-8-18 (only other criminal regulation relating to consular matters covers 
mandatory registration of one’s address).  No recent French decisions have even addressed Article 36.  E.g. 
Case No. 91-21267, 1993 Bull. Civ. I, No. 234, p. 161 (Fr.) (construing Articles 31 and 43 of VCCR) and 
Case No. 86-90325, 1988 Bull. Crim., No. 89, p. 251 (Fr.) (mentioning Article 5 of VCCR).  The dissent in 
Sanchez-Llamas noted at least one German decision declining to suppress confession on VCCR grounds 
despite the domestic effect of that treaty.  126 S. Ct. at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Judgment of 
Nov. 7, 2001, 5 BGHSt 116). 
134 One simple solution may be to have the judge in criminal proceedings inform the defendant of the 
relevant VCCR provisions.  See Candela, supra note 130, at 369 (proposing amendment to Fed. R. Crim. P. 
5).  States that have already adopted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may be more likely than not 
to adopt any amendments to Rule 5 that are designed to allow the United States to fulfill its treaty 
obligations.  See e.g. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(i)(1) and CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 413.10(c) (domesticating U.S. 
obligations under Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial & Extrajudicial Documents in state 
courts). 
135 126 S. Ct. at 2677. But cf. Candela, supra note 130, at 359 (“[s]ince its ratification . . . [the VCCR] was 
considered by the United States to be a self-executing treaty”). 
136 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27); Case Concerning Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 63, ¶ 134 (Mar. 31).  
137 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2694 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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direction that attempts to vindicate individual human rights in spite of the State-centric 
nature of international law.  For example, in Pinochet, the House of Lords held that 
human rights considerations should be taken into account in cases of extradition despite 
the fact that extradition treaties generally exist to preserve only the rights of the states 
involved.138  The debate between American jurists on whether Article 36 even creates 
individual rights merely confirms that, along with most issues arising out of international 
law, “unfortunately, too many courts continue to labor in the international field using 
only the tools of domestic doctrine.”139
Another recent House of Lords decision imposed upon British courts a mandatory 
exclusionary rule applicable to all evidence obtained under torture, even if the torture was 
administered by officials of other governments.140  In that decision, the Law Lords 
determined that the United Kingdom’s commitment to various treaty obligations to 
eliminate torture warranted a mandatory exclusionary rule against evidence obtained by 
torture, even if the U.K. government was not itself to blame.141  That decision has 
garnered considerable attention abroad.142  Yet, the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
implement a mandatory exclusionary rule for violations that do not implicate Fourth or 
Fifth Amendment rights shows how little such international currents have affected 
American shores.143  While American judicial decisions now may seem merely 
                                                 
138 R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 268, 279 
(U.K.H.L.) (per Lord Millet). 
139 Louise Ellen Teitz, Parallel Proceedings – Sisyphean Progress, 36 THE INT’L LAWYER 423, 424 
(Summer 2002). 
140 A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] U.K.H.L. 71, ¶ 51. 
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142 See, e.g., Adrienne Margolis, The Unacceptable Face of Torture, INT’L BAR NEWS, June 2006, at 19. 
143 Some commentators have opined that American judges do not care what foreign opinion of their 
positions is.  See, e.g., Lord Johan Steyn, Lecture: Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, F.A. Mann 
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unfashionable, the question remains as to whether the United States will be left behind if 
other nations’ courts rise to the ICJ’s challenge and vindicate the rights of the foreigner in 
strange criminal courts by seeking to give “full effect” to Article 36 rights.  If such a 
practice becomes prevalent, the practices in the United States with respect to the VCCR 
will cease to be simply unfashionable, and may become a grave matter of noncompliance. 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the most part, this article has assumed that ICJ jurisprudence forms part of the 
VCCR itself.  Continuing with this assumption, it appears that the Supreme Court has 
allowed procedural default rules that protect the efficacy of state court convictions to 
override ICJ interpretations of the United States’ VCCR obligations.  Specifically, the 
Roberts’ Court has determined that the VCCR does not supersede procedural default 
rules.  As a result, criminal defendants in state court must litigate any VCCR rights they 
may have (regardless of whether they or their defense attorneys are ever aware that such 
rights exist).  In declining to prescribe any remedy where federal courts are in a position 
to review VCCR violations, the Court has signaled its obvious indifference to the 
domestic effects of the treaty. 
Moreover, the Court’s latest opinion on the subject appears to solidify the belief 
that the AEDPA prevents the post-conviction review required by ICJ decisions.  The 
Court clearly demonstrated that Article 36 violations cannot be on par with the sorts of 
                                                                                                                                                 
2472, 2495 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or 
fashions on Americans.” (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 123 S. Ct. 470 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari))). 
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constitutional violations necessary to guarantee federal collateral review of a state court 
conviction.  By upholding its earlier opinion in Breard, the Court has interpreted the 
AEDPA’s protection of state court proceedings to override rights created by a federal 
treaty of fundamental significance for U.S. foreign relations, in spite of its own 
jurisprudence on treaty interpretation that allows it to harmonize the AEDPA and the 
VCCR.  In the end, the Supreme Court appears, despite its constitutional powers to 
safeguard the Republic’s duty to honor its treaty obligations, to have changed the issue of 
VCCR compliance into a question of states’ rights.  The several states appear to have 
prevailed in this domestic legal discourse, possibly at the cost of both the federal 
government’s credibility and the well-being of Americans abroad. 
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